Hydroinformatics combines topics of modelling and decision-making, both of which have attracted a great deal of attention outside hydroinformatics from the point of view of uncertainty. Epistemic uncertainties are due to the inevitably incomplete evidence about the dependability of a model or set of competing models. Inherent uncertainties are due to the varying information content inherent in measurements or model predictions, be they probabilistic or fuzzy. Decision-making in management of the aquatic environment is, more often than not, a complex, discursive, multi-player process. The requirement for hydroinformatics systems is to support rather than replace human judgment in this process, a requirement that has significant bearing on the treatment of uncertainty.
INTRODUCTION
In the same way as uncertainty has become a principal theme of research in Artificial Intelligence (Krause & Clark 1993) , it is increasingly a concern for hydroinformaticians (Davis & Blockley 1996) . Whilst early hydroinformaticians were concerned with the development and application of new modelling systems (Abbott 1991) , the maturing of the discipline has seen more reflection on the quality of the information that hydroinformatics provides and how it contributes to decision-making processes (Abbott & Jonoski 1998 Abbott 2001) . This increasing maturity coincides with the advent of the computational capacity to do a large number of simulations using fairly sophisticated models and to propagate more complex uncertainty structures in order to generate ensemble predictions and scrutinise the effects of uncertainties.
The maturing of hydroinformatics also coincides with the latest phase in a debate about the mathematisation of uncertainty that began about half a century ago. Within probability theory the neo-Bayesian school is in the ascendancy (Lindley 1987; Pearl 1988; Schum 1994; Wright & Ayton 1994) . Meanwhile, after initial bewilderment and rejection by conventional probabilists, fuzzy methods and evidence theory are becoming regarded as legitimate extensions of classical probability. The rearguard action by conventional probabilists against non-standard methods is formidable and is being enacted most fiercely by the neo-Bayesians (Lindley 1982; French 1986 French , 1995 Cooke 1991) . However, now that coherent generalisations of probability have emerged in the form of the mathematical theory of evidence (Shafer 1976) , random set theory (Dubois & Prade 1991; Goutsias et al. 1997) , the theory of imprecise probabilities (Walley 1991) and, retrospectively, in Choquet's theory of capacities (Choquet 1953 ) the argument is no longer one of mathematical coherence. The argument now hinges on the relative parsimony of the competing theories and practical issues of elicitation and accessibility.
The aim of this paper is to identify the challenges presented by uncertainty handling in hydroinformatics and indicate some potential responses to those challenges.
The analysis is both discursive and mathematical. Understanding of uncertainty is grounded in epistemology, yet that understanding has to be formally encoded if it is to be enacted in computer systems. The title of this paper refers to 'the hydroinformatic process' in order to narrow the scope of the almost boundless topic of uncertainty to those aspects that have most bearing on the practice of hydroinformatics, i.e. the process of using electronically encapsulated knowledge to support management of the water environment. However, before turning to the practice of hydroinformatics we must begin with some philosophy.
THE MODELLING PROCESS
Philosophical preliminaries Beven (2001) , in his critical review of the prospects for distributed hydrological modelling, characterised modellers as pragmatic or heuristic realists. He justified this on the grounds that hydrological modellers reason and behave as if rainfall, runoff, streamflow and the other processes that concern them exist independently of their perceptions and empirical studies of them. This extends even to quantities that are not (yet) observable. Modelling is seen as a process of abstraction from objective reality.
Uncertainty is associated with the mismatch between models and reality. It is a view with which we have a great deal of sympathy, particularly as it coincides with our own everyday experience of the conduct of hydraulic modelling activities, at least at an instinctive level. Beven's observation is of the everyday temperament and behaviour of practitioners rather than being an ontological assertion, and rightly so. The sceptical philosophers, Hume foremost amongst them, have demonstrated how little we can assert about reality and Kant went much further than any before him in defining the limits that circumscribe the assertions we can make about reality.
Here we follow Kant in using the term 'noumenal' to refer to the underlying reality in the world and the term 'phenomenal' to refer to empirical observations and empirically derived knowledge (Figure 1 ). We cannot possibly know what the noumenal is like. All we have are empirical observations, which are profoundly influenced by the means of observing. The scientific process involves establishing shared standards of observation and measurement in order to establish a common (inter-subjective) vocabulary of the phenomenal. Scientific models are constructed in order to make sense of empirical observations and, in particular, to make predictions of the phenomena that may be observed in future. The motive for constructing models may be a purely scientific quest for knowledge but, in the context of hydroinformatics, it is driven by the more pragmatic concerns of management of the water environment, in which case the requirement is to predict how various management options, including the status quo, may behave in future.
Models begin their life as 'conjectures-highly informative guesses' (Popper 1963) . They are externalised (increasingly in electronic media according to hydroinformaticians) so that they can be shared and tested. They come to inhabit what Popper & Eccles (1977) referred to as 'World 3'-the world of collective knowledge. Within that collective knowledge will be growing experience of how a model compares with empirical observations. However, comparison with observation will not be the only criterion that an experienced modeller takes into account when choosing to adopt a particular modelling strategy. Besides practical considerations of availability and cost, they will scrutinise the processes that a given model enacts and endeavour to reach a view on how those processes compare with alternative formulations of the phenomenon of interest. Process-based reasoning provides insights about the type of phenomena a model can be expected to predict and the range over which such predictions can be expected to be accurate.
Evidence-based reasoning about model dependability (epistemic uncertainty)
Beyond the first bold acts of imagination that initiate a model and accompany its evolution, the process of model testing and choice is one of evidence-based reasoning. It takes place in the 'open world' of our unbounded perceptions, whilst models themselves (at least once they are encoded digitally) are closed formal constructs. Because the domain of the mapping from 'open world' to model space is unbounded, there is a fundamental limit to the statements that can be made about the goodness of that mapping. Popper suggested that we can at least falsify a scientific model, by observation, even if we can never say that it is a 'true' model. The Bayesian notion of the 'probability of a model being true' is extremely problematic in this respect. In situations where there are populations of measurements then statistical constructs, such as significance testing, provide the pretence of objective model evaluation but, of course, depend on ultimately arbitrary significance levels. In data-poor situations, which are common in many of the most interesting aquatic problems (relating, for example, to extreme events or risk assessment), model users are obliged to assemble evidence from whatever source may be available, irrespective of the data format, be it measurements, analogues or expert judgements. The problem then becomes one of bringing that evidence together in a coherent way in order to make an evidence-based statement about the dependability of a model as a basis for decision-making. We use the term 'dependability' rather than 'truth' because we know from Popper that we can never say that a model is true.
Dependability is a weaker term, which relates to the extent to which a model provides a sound basis for decisionmaking. The more well-tested a model is, the more (and the more diverse) the confirmatory instances that have been observed, and the better defined are the limits of applicability of a model, the greater is the justification for believing that it is dependable within those limits (Blockley 1980) . For the time being, this evidence-based reasoning process, which is so central to responsible modelling, is scarcely supported in hydroinformatics systems, though , 2003 and Hall et al. (1999) have suggested how this may be done using graphical methods and an appropriate uncertainty calculus.
Evidence-based reasoning about the truth or dependability of a model is conventionally thought of as being a problem of 'epistemic uncertainty' (see Helton & Burmaster (1996) for a review). Epistemic uncertainty is associated with a lack of knowledge about a phenomenon of interest. Epistemic uncertainties change with ones' state of knowledge.
Information content (inherent uncertainty)
The information content in a model is a feature of the scale at which it represents a phenomenon of interest and the format in which the model results are presented. The most informative type of prediction is a precise deterministic prediction. Indeed, information theory suggests that such a prediction is infinitely informative (it has zero information entropy), so it is perhaps surprising that hydraulic modellers are so willing to present their results in this format. Less informative are probabilistic predictions, interval bounds (precise or fuzzy) on a (deterministic or probabilistic) prediction and predictions expressed in natural language. Generalised information theory (Klir 1991; Klir & Wierman 1999 ) provides a mechanism for measuring information content. The notion that information appears in a range of different degrees of fuzziness or vagueness (the term used by Russell (1923) and more recently by Williamson (1994) ), from precise mathematical statements to vacuously vague statements, is as fundamental to hydroinformatics as it is to linguistics and human reasoning (Labov 1973) . The more precise predictions are, the more useful they are, yet the easier they are to falsify (Blockley 1980) . The case when the observations lend themselves to a probabilistic description is often referred to as a situation of 'inherent' or 'aleatory' uncertainty, the term 'aleatory' coming from the Latin aleator, meaning 'dicer'. The existence of a special term (indeed, two terms that are commonly used more or less interchangeably) to refer to the situation where observations conform well to a probabilistic model betrays the prevailing prejudice towards probability amongst uncertainty theorists. Aleatory uncertainty is associated with variability in known (or observable) populations and is thought of as being irreducible (Ferson & Ginzberg 1996; Parry 1996; Winkler 1996) . A step further, which in our opinion is ontologically insubstantiable, is to talk about aleatory uncertainties being a feature of reality. We prefer to proceed with an operational definition of aleatory uncertainties as being a feature of populations of measurements that conform well to a probabilistic model, thus avoiding insubstantiable assertions about the nature of reality (see Casti (1992) for a system-theoretic discussion). We use the term 'inherent uncertainty' to deal with any uncertainty inherent in the vocabulary of models. Thus in our definition probabilistic, fuzzy, set-based or linguistic information are all inherently uncertain.
Situations when observations obviously suggest a particular information format, be it deterministic, probabilistic or imprecise, are special cases. On the whole, observations of phenomena that interest hydroinformaticians will show some regularity, some random variability and some imprecision. Choosing an appropriate parameter format is a matter of skill and judgement.
Besides being related to the format in which model parameters or predictions appear, information content is also a feature of the structure of a model itself, for example the number of parameters a model employs and the scale at which it resolves the phenomenon of interest. A coarsescale model contains less precise information than a finescale model. A model with more parameters is potentially more powerful than one with fewer because it may be able to resolve a more subtle set of potential changes, be they management options (changes at the discretion of a decision-maker, for example river maintenance strategies) or external changes (for example, climate change), though this power, if it is achievable at all, may be costly and perhaps also inelegant. However, due to lack of appropriate measurements, or lack of a dependable description of the processes at a fine scale, or lack of computational resources, or respect for Ockham's razor, a modeller may choose to adopt a coarser-scale model. Moreover, some system behaviours that are not evident at small scales become recognisable at larger scales (de Vriend 1991). Moreover, there is the problem that the same mathematical vocabulary (conventionally probability) has to be used to accomplish two arguably different tasks. The suitability of probability for dealing with epistemic uncertainties has been particularly challenged (Shafer 1987; . Evidence theory, which is described below, provides a richer mathematical vocabulary, but still does not provide a perfect solution to the problem of representing different aspects of uncertainty.
A number of authors (Hoffman & Hammonds 1994;
Ferson & Ginzberg 1996; Hoffer 1996; Mosleh & Bier 1996) do identify situations where they argue that, from the point of view of decision-making, it is productive to try, as far as possible, to separate out uncertainties. In this difficult problem of separating uncertainties, as in other thorny problems of uncertainty, analysis of the decision context points towards some pragmatic solutions, so it is to decision-making in hydroinformatics that we now turn.
DECISION-MAKING CONTEXT
The inception of hydroinformatics has been traced to the development of fourth generation modelling tools in the mid-1980s (Abbott 1999) . These were partially automated numerical simulation packages for modelling a range of behaviours in the hydraulic world (flow problems, sediment transport, pollution dispersal, etc.). They were being used to inform a diverse range of engineering and management decisions. However, these hydroinformatic tools provided insights about the water world that were meaningful, even in the absence of a specific decision context.
Indeed, a given modelling tool could be used to inform a range of decisions, an approach that has found increasing favour in the intervening years, with water authorities establishing maintained models of the systems for which they are responsible so that they can be used on an ad hoc basis to inform decisions that may not even have been foreseen when the model was established.
Subsequent evolution in hydroinformatics can be seen as development towards systems that can be truly thought of as knowledge-based decision-support systems. They are being used in the conventional sense of decision-support systems, which aim to support rather than replace human judgement (Angehrn & Jelassi 1994 We have introduced Smet's distinction because it helps to explain our reservations concerning strictly decision-theoretic axiomisations of uncertainty. In clearly decision-theoretic situations that relate closely to the gambling analogies of subjective probability (for example, trading on the financial markets), the axiomatic arguments for subjective probability carry a great deal of weight, though, as has been shown by Walley (1991) , it is possible to weaken those axioms and still avoid certain loss. Some hydroinformaticians may find themselves in analogous situations, for example if they are involved in pricing options for hydroelectric power supply. However, the majority are involved in less self-contained decisionmaking situations. They are involved in socially and politically negotiated processes where an individual decision-maker may not even be identifiable and where it will often be extremely difficult to attach a financial value to some, or indeed many, of the attributes of the water system. Hydroinformatics models bring evidence to bear on these complex social decision-making processes. Knight (1921) 
MATHEMATICS OF UNCERTAINTY
The conceptual appreciation of uncertainty and its role in decision-making is necessary but not sufficient to advance the treatment of uncertainty in hydroinformatics. To encode uncertainty in hydroinformatic tools requires a formal language. Fragments of that language are already commonplace, particularly in the field of stochastic hydraulics.
Of all the methods for handling uncertainty, probability theory has by far the longest tradition and is the best understood. That of course does not imply that it should be beyond criticism as a method of handling uncertainty. It does, however, mean that it is relatively well tested and well developed and can act as a standard against which other more recent approaches may be measured (Krause & Clark 1993) .
The concept of probability may be defined and interpreted in several different ways (Lind 1996) , the chief ones arising from the five approaches discussed in the following sections.
The classical approach
A game of chance has a finite number of different possible outcomes, which are assumed to be equally likely.
The probability of an event (i.e. a particular outcome of interest) is then defined as the proportion of the total possible outcomes for which that event does occur. Evaluating probabilities in this framework involves counting methods (e.g. permutations and combinations).
Pioneering work on mathematising games of chance was undertaken in the late 16th and early 17th centuries by Cardano, Galileo, Pascal and others (Hacking 1975) .
However, the word probability was not mentioned by these early researchers. For medieval and Renaissance thinkers, probability belonged to the realm of opinion and argument, where the random was quite out of place.
The frequency approach
The frequency approach relates to the situation where an experiment can be repeated indefinitely under essentially identical conditions, but the observed outcome is random (not the same every time). Empirical evidence suggests that the proportion of times any particular event has occurred, i.e. its relative frequency, converges to a limit as the number of repetitions increases. This limit is the probability of the event. Proponents of the frequency approach, Fisher (1956) having been perhaps the most notable, take the view that probability is about countable events.
The propensity interpretation
The frequentist interpretation of a long sequence of events repeated under essentially identical conditions may be rather difficult to realise in practice. How is the probability of a breach in a specific dam to be interpreted when it has never been observed and may never be observed in the future? For unrepeatable phenomena the frequentist interpretation of probability ceases to have meaning. In this case probability is usually interpreted as a measure of the propensity or tendency for the specified event to occur (Popper 1959) . It is possible to estimate the propensity of unrepeatable, yet nonetheless interesting, events by extending frequentist knowledge through causal models of physical phenomena.
The subjective approach
In this approach probability is used as a measure of belief in a statement. An event is a statement and the (subjective) probability of the event is a measure of the degree of belief which the subject has in the truth of the statement. If we imagine that a 'prize' is available if and only if the statement does turn out to be true, the subjective probability can be thought of as the proportion of the prize money which the subject is prepared to gamble in the hope of winning the prize. It is often by analogy to games of chance that subjective probabilities are constructed (de Finetti 1937 (de Finetti /1980 Savage 1954 ).
According to the subjective view there is no such thing as a 'true' probability. probabilities.
The logical approach
Formal logic depends on relationships of the kind A→B ('A implies B') between propositions. The logical approach to probability generalises the concept of implication to partial implication; the conditional probability of B given A measures the extent to which A implies B (Keynes 1921; Jeffreys 1948) . In the logical interpretation a conditional probability P(AzB) is an assertion about the degree of 'logical proximity' of A and B or, more precisely, the degree to which statement B contains information that is expressed in A. If B says all that is said by A, so that A follows from B, then P(AzB) = 1 (Popper 1957 ). Carnap (1950) constructed a systematic version of this analysis, but found that in effect there is an infinite number of ways of assigning probabilities (Cohen 1989) . The logical approach therefore differs from the subjective approach in which probabilities are assigned by recourse to some personal measure or judgement.
Probability and hydroinformatics
The frequency approach to probability is familiar in stochastic hydraulics and hydrology. However, hydroinformatics is not merely about numerical and statistical modelling. Decision-makers are often interested in unrepeatable phenomena, in which case a propensity interpretation of probability is more appropriate than a frequency interpretation. More profoundly, the hydroinformatic endeavour is to do with human and machine reasoning about the aquatic environment, and so requires a mechanism for manipulating uncertain beliefs and also for meta-level reasoning about the quality of models and the information they bring to bear on decision-making situations. Logical interpretations of probability have not been operationally demonstrated in these situations.
Meanwhile, whilst the hydroinformatics' requirement is for a mechanism for handling uncertain knowledge in its broadest sense, it is not at all clear that the Bayesian mathematisation of subjective probability can satisfy this requirement in practice. Let us therefore examine the axioms of probability theory to establish whether they are suitable for the task.
In the following axiomisation the universal set X contains all the relevant events. Probability is a function P: 
where N is the set of positive integers. The third axiom is the additivity axiom of probability. For a single A,X,
i.e. the probability of an event and its negation must sum to unity. Although in some circumstance beliefs about an event and its negation may be described by the additivity axiom there are empirical and theoretical arguments why this should not be universally true (Shafer 1978) . Descriptive studies of human reasoning and decision-making provide little evidence that human subjects process information in a manner which corresponds to probability theory (Kahneman et al. 1982) . On the contrary, humans adopt heuristics and biases which, whilst not conforming to probability theory, may be an intelligent way of coping with complexity and the limited information processing powers which humans can apply to decision-making situations (March 1988). Now hydroinformatics systems are rarely intended to be descriptive models of human decision-making, in which case it could be argued that these empirical observations are irrelevant. However, if the intention of a hydroinformatics system is intelligent processing of uncertain information then it is surely wise to reflect on the reasons why intelligent human behaviour may depart from the axioms of conventional probability theory.
Probing the nature of human reasoning about aquatic systems it is found that much of that reasoning is possibilistic rather than strictly probabilistic. We reason about whether a given scenario could happen, without necessarily endeavouring to attach probabilities to the likelihood of it happening, particularly in situations of very scarce information. Shackle (1961) Bayesians can be legitimately challenged to explain where prior probability distributions originate (Levi 1982) .
In practice, populations of data are finite and there are practical limits to the quantity of information that can be elicited from experts. In both cases some further assump- Moreover, Keynes (1921) showed that incautious adoption of the uniform distribution can lead to contradictions.
Ben-Haim (1996) cites several practical cases in which engineering practice reflects the practical impossibility of identifying a specific model from a set of alternatives. For example, standard spectra are used to represent wave load spectra for offshore platforms because, in practice, it is impossible to precisely determine the loading spectrum at a given site. Conventions such as standard loading spectra have been essential to enable practical application of probabilistic methods in engineering design and regulation. Yet consequently the probability numbers generated can be highly misleading and their status quite unclear.
The forgoing leads us to conclude that conventional probability is not a rich enough vocabulary to handle uncertainty in hydroinformatics. We have already noted some counter-arguments to this view, summed up by Lindley (1987) who suggests that 'probability is a rich and subtle concept capable of dealing with beautifully delicate and important problems'. We do not subscribe to this view, believing that the modern mathematics of uncertainty provides a richer vocabulary. The existence of this vocabulary cannot be denied. At issue merely is the question of whether to ignore this vocabulary and, for reasons of parsimony and coherence, confine ourselves to conventional probability, or alternatively critically scrutinise this emerging paradigm to establish whether it may be helpful, particularly in situations where conventional probability has been most challenged. We have adopted the latter approach, and in the following section provide a brief introduction, an outline of the relationship between different theoretical branches and a very simple example.
GENERALISED MATHEMATISATION OF UNCERTAINTY
It is possible to generalise classical probability theory by weakening the third axiom from one of additivity to one of
monotonicity, i.e. for all A, BPX, if A#B then P(A)#P(B).
Indeed a monotone measure does not necessarily have to be normalised (Axiom 2), and so can be defined as the can be related to one another from a hierarchical point of view, i.e. the theory shown above subsumes the theory shown below. All of the theories shown in Figure 2 , other than classical probability, are theories of nonadditive monotone measures.
The split at the bottom of the tree, at Choquet capacities order`, reflects the two sides to uncertainty that can be represented by using measure theory: randomness (or ambiguity) and fuzziness (or imprecision).
Probability deals with the random aspects of uncertainty. Above classical probability in Figure 2 lie Sugeno l-measures (Sugeno 1977) , which are a mixture of classical probability theory and evidence theory, depending on the value of l. Sugeno l-measures have not been developed in practice.
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Shafer 1976 ), referred to here as 'evidence theory', includes both possibility theory and probability theory as special cases. It therefore includes aspects of imprecision, in as much as it is structured on sets of varying granularity (known as 'focal elements'). A normalised measure (referred to by Shafer as a 'basic probability assignment' but here called a 'mass assignment') is distributed over these focal elements, thereby also capturing aspects of ambiguity/randomness. Evidence theory is outlined in more formal terms below, where it will be seen to be equivalent to the theory of random sets, which originated in the field of stochastic geometry (Kendall 1974; Matheron 1975) .
As indicated in Figure 2 , evidence theory is equivalent to the simplest of the infinite sequence of theories of uncertainty identified by Choquet (Klir & Smith 2001) .
Choquet referred to this simplest theory as a capacity of 'order infinity'. The higher-order theories in Figure 2 can be thought of as relating to families of probability distributions that are monotonic to a progressively lesser degree than the Dempster-Shafer theory. These higherorder theories are in the early stages of mathematical development and the interested reader is directed towards the literature of coherent lower and upper previsions (Walley 1991 (Walley , 2000 , closed convex sets of probability distributions (Kyburg 1987) , coherent lower and upper probabilities (Walley 1991 (Walley , 1996 and feasible intervalvalued probability distributions (Weichselberger & Pohlmann 1990; Pan & Klir 1997) . 
Evidence theory
Evidence theory is the simplest and most established of the theories that combine probability and possibility in the same theoretical framework. It has therefore been adopted here to provide a simple illustrative example of the application of generalised uncertainty handling to a waterrelated problem. Evidence theory is distinct from probability theory in the sense that the mass assignment m is a mapping from non-empty members J of the power set 
and its dual plausibility function Pl(A) is defined by
Bel(A) can be viewed as the lower bound on a family of probability measures and Pl(A) as the upper bound, although the converse is not true, i.e. lower and upper probability functions are more general than belief and plausibility functions (Figure 2 ). When J contains only singletons Bel = Pl is a probability measure.
When J is a nested family A 1 ,A 2 , . . . , A n then Bel and Pl satisfy the decomposability properties:
Pl(A˘B) = max(Pl(A), Pl(B))
and Pl is a possibility measure in the sense of Zadeh (1978) .
In that case (J, m) is called a consonant random set. A fuzzy set A can be defined from any random set (J, m) as follows:
where m F is the fuzzy membership function. When J is nested, m F is normalized, i.e. 'u, m F (u) = 1.
Use of evidence theory in hydroinformatics models
Many hydroinformatics models are of the form y = f(x), where x is a vector (x 1 , x 2 , . . ., x n ) of input parameters and 
This is the extension principle for random sets. It provides a mechanism for projecting uncertain information through a function f, provided it can be represented as a random relation. In general Equations (9) involve calculating the image of each focal element R i PR, by applying twice the techniques of global optimisation. However, special cases exist when the function f is monotonic (Dong & Shah 1987; Tonon et al. 2000) , when the random relation (R, ) is consonant, i.e. a fuzzy set, and when it is a probability distribution (Dubois & Prade 1991) .
To illustrate the operation of the extension principle are mean values extracted from physical model studies.
There was scatter in this experimental data, which could be reflected in a probability distribution. However, more significant are the uncertainties related to transferring a parametric model developed from experimental data to a specific site. To reflect these uncertainties, the coefficients a and b (corresponding to a 1:2 seawall slope) have been assigned the fuzzy sets shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. These fuzzy sets were represented as consonant random sets at five different membership levels.
The random set obtained by applying the extension principle (Equations (9)) to Owen's equation (Equation (10)) contained 12,525 focal elements. One of the problems of random set analysis is visualising the rather complex uncertainty structures that are generated. A convenient way of doing so is to plot lower and upper cumulative probabilities ( Figure 5) 
according to its extreme lower and upper limits. The lower and upper cumulative probability distribution functions, F * (x) and F*(x), respectively, at some point x can be obtained as follows:
and
The bounds shown in Figure 5 are upper and lower probability bounds on the overtopping discharge. They As argued towards the beginning of this paper, the decision as to whether an uncertain quantity or process should be modelled using probability or imprecision is not a clear-cut one. The vocabulary of the resulting prediction will have to be explained to the decisionmaker and wider stakeholder groups. Fortunately, empirical evidence, although limited, suggests that methods based on fuzzy sets and intervals are no less accessible than probabilistic methods (Curley & Golden 1994 ) and our experience is that they can be much more so (Davis and Hall 2003) . 
CONCLUSIONS
Uncertainty is one of the outstanding challenges in hydroinformatics. If its treatment is to be advanced, a conceptual structure and practical methods are required for handling uncertainty in the hydroinformatic process. This paper has endeavoured to contribute in both conceptual and practical terms. We anticipate that, due to a combination of increasing appreciation of the mathematics of uncertainty, ever-improving computational resources and demands from policy and decision-makers, the analysis of uncertainty will in the future become a much more routine aspect of hydroinformatics. The success of simple spreadsheet add-ins for Monte Carlo simulation illustrates the demand for uncertainty analysis, albeit often fairly naive.
In hydroinformatics there is the opportunity to develop a much more subtle appreciation of uncertainty and decision-support tools.
Uncertainty is an inevitable consequence of abstracting from perceptions of the phenomenal world into closed formal constructs (models). A model will be a selective abstraction, usually constructed with a specific purpose or purposes in mind. One fundamental source of uncertainty, which is customarily referred to as 'epistemic' uncertainty, is the nature of that abstraction and the incomplete and sometimes conflicting evidence about whether a model is fit for its purpose. Meanwhile, any measurements or predictions will be expressed in a vocabulary that will be more or less uncertain. Thus, for example, probabilistic statements about populations of measurements are said to contain 'aleatory' uncertainty. In this paper 'inherent'
uncertainties have been thought of in more general terms as the uncertainty associated with the non-deterministic format of measurements or predictions, be that format probabilistic, fuzzy or both. The choice of scale at which to model a phenomenon of interest is influenced by considerations of both epistemic and inherent uncertainties.
A formal language is required in order to encode uncertainty in hydroinformatics systems. Beginning with probability theory, which is the standard against which alternative theories will inevitably be compared, various mathematisations of uncertainty and their interpretations have been reviewed. The choice of uncertainty mathematisation and the semantics applied to it will always, to some extent, be a matter of taste. However, we have argued that purely probabilistic treatment of uncertainty does not lend itself to some of the more subtle aspects of uncertainty handling in hydroinformatics, such as reasoning about model dependability, representation of very sparse knowledge or informing deliberative decision processes. Although some important issues remain to be resolved, we believe that the generalised mathematics of uncertainty provides a more subtle and expressive vocabulary than conventional probability. Since the inception of fuzzy set theory in the 1970s there has been widespread confusion about the relationship between fuzzy sets and probability. It is now clear that these two theories relate to different aspects of uncertainty and that there are coherent generalisations. We have illustrated how evidence theory (and its counterpart, interpretation as a random set) is the best developed of these generalisations and can be applied in practice to the types of algebraic or numerical functions that form the kernel of hydroinformatic systems.
